του Π.
Ήφαιστου
Με
αφορμή το άρθρο του David Vine, The United
States Probably Has More Foreign Military Bases Than Any Other People, Nation,
or Empire in history, για την πλανητική παρουσία των ΗΠΑ.
Όπως
έχουμε υποστηρίξει επανειλημμένα μεγάλο μέρος των προβλημάτων των Ελλήνων
έγκειται στην ελλειμματική γνώση και κατανόηση της σύγχρονης διεθνούς
πολιτικής. Είναι μια παθογένεια που αρχίζει αμέσως μετά την Επανάσταση όταν η
δομή, η κυρίαρχη κρατική λογική και οι προσανατολισμοί του νεοελληνικού κράτους
δεν ήταν επαρκώς συμβατά με την κρατοκεντρική δομή του διεθνούς συστήματος.
Αυτό, μεταξύ άλλων, επαληθεύτηκε:
- Με τις αντιφάσεις γύρω από την
Μεγάλη Ιδέα, την περιπέτεια του 1922 που κατέστρεψε τον Ελληνισμό της
Ανατολής, τις στάσεις στον Μεσοπόλεμο,
- με τον Εμφύλιο πόλεμο, τα
δόγματα εξάρτησης και τα διεθνιστικά και κοσμοπολίτικα αλληθωρίσματα που
ροκάνισαν την νεοελληνική πολιτεία καθ’ όλη την διάρκεια της μεταπολεμικής
περιόδου.
- Με το γεγονός ότι σταδιακά μετά
την μεταπολίτευση του 1974 όλοι οι δράστες –και οι απόγονοί τους–
λανθασμένων προσανατολισμών ένωσαν τα νήματά τους οδηγώντας την Ελληνική
κοινωνία σε ανορθολογική τροχιά.
- Με την νοήματοδότηση της
ένταξης στην Ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση ως περίπου και η Ελλάδα να είναι φτωχός
συγγενής και όχι ισότιμο μέλος (πρόσεξε κανείς την αυτοπεποίθηση και
μελετημένη συμμετοχή μικρότερων κρατών στις τελευταίες συνόδους κορυφής
και μάλιστα εις βάρος της Ελλάδας όταν τα συμφέροντά τους το απαιτούσαν;).
- Με ανάπτυξη θεωρημάτων και
ιδεολογημάτων περί μιας διεθνιστικής Ευρώπης ενώ αυτό το ζήτημα είχε ήδη
αποφασιστεί από την δεκαετία του 1960.
- Με παντελή αμέλεια απόκτησης
επαρκούς γνώσης γύρω από τα ευρωστρατηγικά που προσδιορίζουν και τις
αποφάσεις. Αυτό συνέτεινε και στο τελικό αυτοκτονικό άλμα στο κενό όταν
άσκοπα, άκριτα και απροετοίμαστα η Ελλάδα εντάχθηκε στην ΟΝΕ.
- Με μια αξιοθρήνητη κυριαρχία
των εθνομηδενιστικών θεωρημάτων και ιδεολογημάτων που εκκένωσαν ή
κατέστησαν πνευματικά αδιάφορα πολλά μέλη της κοινωνίας
Και τα
λοιπά που όλοι γνωρίζουμε καθότι καταμαρτυρούνται καθημερινά με την εναλλαγή
στη εξουσία ατόμων και ομάδων που ανταγωνίζονται όχι με όρους καλύτερης
εξυπηρέτησης του εθνικού συμφέροντος αλλά με όρους υποταγής στους ξένους και
καθυπόταξης της κοινωνίας.
Ο
υπόλοιπος κόσμος στον πλανήτη καθώς επίσης και η Ευρώπη, όμως, κινούταν
διαφορετικά απ’ ότι τα πνευματικά και γνωστικά μπερδεμένα αριστεροδεξιά
ελληνικά ορφανά του Ψυχρού Πολέμου.
Όπως
κάποιοι υπογραμμίσαμε ήδη στη αφετηρία της μεταψυχροπολεμικής εποχής, το 1990
συμβόλιζε μια γιγαντιαία ανακατανομή ισχύος.
Μια σωστή
εκτίμηση των πραγμάτων προϋπόθετε ότι η κρατική μας θεωρία θα εδραζόταν στην
θέση πως μια τόσο μεγάλη ανακατανομή ισχύος θα προκαλούσε πλανητικές
ισορροπίες, διενέξεις για την δημιουργία νέων ισορροπιών, πολέμους στις
περιφέρειες και Συμπληγάδες μέσα στις οποίες θα βρίσκονταν τα λιγότερο ισχυρά
κράτη τα οποία ως εκ τούτου απαιτείτο να είναι εκατό φορές πιο προσεκτικά απ’
ότι στο παρελθόν όταν ο πλανήτης λόγω πυρηνικής ισορροπίας κατά την διάρκεια
του Ψυχρού Πολέμου υπήρχε μια σχετική
σταθερότητα.
Μαζί με τα
ανωτέρω και πολλά άλλα που κατά καιρούς γράφουμε –και τα οποία κατά τα άλλα
είναι πασίδηλα– απαιτείται να συνεκτιμάται και το γεγονός ότι το διπολικό σύστημα σταδιακά καθίσταται
πολυπολικό, ένα δηλαδή πολύ διαφορετικό και πολύ πιο δύσκολο περιβάλλον
διεθνούς πολιτικής.
Κοσμοθεωρία
Εθνών
Επειδή τα
γραπτά μένουν λέμε συνοπτικά ότι στην μεταψυχροπολεμική Ελλάδα κυριάρχησε μια
νεφελοβατούσα στάση από όσους κατείχαν την εξουσία. Την κοινωνία κάποιοι
ανεπίγνωστα ή «μεθοδικά» κυριολεκτικά την ροκάνισαν.
- Απίστευτες ασυναρτησίες περί
παγκοσμιοποίησης,
- Μια όπως ήδη αναφέρθηκε
απίστευτα λανθασμένη κυριαρχία ιδεολογημάτων για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση,
- μια κατευναστική τακτική
απέναντι στις απειλές,
- ένας αμέριμνος διπλωματικός
περίπατος μέσα στην περιφέρειά μας η οποία εξαρχής έγινε επίκεντρο
καταιγιστικών στρατηγικών ανακατατάξεων,
- μια απίστευτης επιπολαιότητας
στάση των Αθηνών απέναντι στην Κύπρο (όλα αυτά τα αυτοκτονικά περί
διζωνικής και δικοινοτικής ομοσπονδίας αντί στρατηγικής αποκατάστασης της
διεθνούς νομιμότητας)
- και μια τουλάχιστον
ερασιτεχνική στάση απέναντι στις μεγάλες δυνάμεις (οι οποίες ως γνωστό
θεωρούν τα απρόσεκτα κράτη αναλώσιμα και υποψήφια για την κλίνη του
Προκρούστη των στρατηγικών παιγνίων)
Το άρθρο
του David Vine στο The Nation δεν λέει κάτι άγνωστο. Εξηγεί –κριτικά από μια
Αμερικανική άποψη– την πλανητική στρατιωτική παρουσία των ΗΠΑ. Αυτό βέβαια
είναι άλλης τάξης ζήτημα που σχετίζεται είτε με ενδό-Αμερικανικές συζητήσεις για
την στρατηγική των ΗΠΑ είτε προειδοποιήσεις και κριτικές για ένα πολύ πιο
σοβαρό ζήτημα, την μεταψυχροπολεμική υπερεξάπλωση.
Αυτό που
χρειαζόταν εμείς να ξέρουμε είναι:
- Ότι ο σταδιακά πολυπολικός χαρακτήρας του διεθνούς συστήματος (που απαιτεί μια πιο εξεζητημένη κρατοκεντρική λογική και μια συνεπακόλουθη στρατηγική θεωρία) απαιτούσε μια κυρίαρχη στρατηγική θεωρία η οποία θKondylisExhroiFiloi 001α παρήγαγε μια σιδερένια εθνική στρατηγική που θα στήριζε τα ιεραρχημένα και αλληλένδετα εθνικά συμφέροντα.
- Ότι ο οικονομικός και
στρατηγικός ανταγωνισμός θα γινόταν ολοένα και πιο ανελέητος, γεγονός που
απαιτούσε να καταστεί η οικονομία μας και οι θεσμοί μας ανταγωνιστικοί
(αντί όπως είπαμε άκριτα να τα ρίξουν στο λάκκο των λεόντων της ΟΝΕ όπου
οι διανεμητικές λειτουργίες των χρηματοοικονομικών αποφάσεων είναι
αθέσπιστες)
- Ότι κοινωνία τα μέλη της οποίας δεν είναι στρατηγικά προσανατολισμένα στην στήριξη του κράτους στο ανταγωνιστικό διεθνές σύστημα είναι καταδικασμένη με τον ένα ή άλλο τρόπο να απωλέσει την εθνική της ανεξαρτησία.
- Ότι ένας τέτοιος στρατηγικός
προσανατολισμός σημαίνει ένα κυρίαρχο κοσμοθεωρητικό προσανατολισμό που θα
προκαλεί αναζωογονητικές πνευματικές εισροές που θα στηρίζουν το
κοινωνικοπολιτικό σύστημα και θα το καθιστούν πολιτικά ορθολογικό. Το
αντίθετο συνέβαινε, όπως είπαμε, καθότι αριστεροδεξιά και πανταχόθεν
κυριάρχησαν τα υπονομευτικά για κάθε κράτος εθνομηδενιστικά ιδεολογήματα.
Το ερώτημα
πλέον είναι: Υπάρχει δυνατότητα ανάκαμψης και αντιστροφής όταν οι ίδιοι δράστες
της μεταπολίτευσης ανταγωνίζονται το πώς θα υπηρετήσουν καλύτερα την καταστολή
της κοινωνίας που επέβαλαν ηγεμονικά κράτη, κερδοσκόποι και τοκογλύφοι! Μόνο
όπως γράψαμε ξανά με μια ειρηνική μη εμφύλια ριζοσπαστική πολιτειακή αλλαγή που
θα προσανατολίσει δημοκρατικά το νεοελληνικό κράτος. Κάτι το απρόβλεπτο καθότι
όπως υποστηρίξαμε η απάντησε βρίσκεται βαθιά μέσα στον πυρήνα του νεοελληνικού
συλλογικού ενστίκτου επιβίωσης. Πόσο δυνατό είναι; Καθότι σύντομα θα
δοκιμαστεί.
Π.
Ήφαιστος – P. Ifestos
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Υστερόγραφο
Στο
εξώφυλλο της ανάρτησης μπήκε το εμβληματικό έργο του John Mearsheimer, Η
τραγωδία της πολιτικής τω μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Το έργο αυτό μαζί με το εξίσου
σπουδαίο του Παναγιώτη Κονδύλη από τον 21 στον 21 αιώνα θεωρώ ότι περιέχουν τις
πιο σωστές θεωρήσεις για τις δεκαετίες που έρχονται.
Το άρθρο του David Vine
With the US
military having withdrawn many of its forces from Iraq
and Afghanistan ,
most Americans would be forgiven for being unaware that hundreds of US bases and
hundreds of thousands of US troops still encircle the globe. Although few know
it, the United States
garrisons the planet unlike any country in history, and the evidence is on view
from Honduras to Oman , Japan to Germany ,
Singapore to Djibouti .
Like most Americans, for most of my life, I rarely
thought about military bases. Scholar and former CIA consultant Chalmers
Johnson described me well when he wrote in 2004, “As distinct from other
peoples, most Americans do not recognize—or do not want to recognize—that the
United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government
secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the fact that our garrisons
encircle the planet.”
To the extent that Americans think about these bases
at all, we generally assume they’re essential to national security and global
peace. Our leaders have claimed as much since most of them were established
during World War II and the early days of the Cold War. As a result, we
consider the situation normal and accept that US military installations exist
in staggering numbers in other countries, on other peoples’ land. On the other
hand, the idea that there would be foreign bases on US soil is unthinkable.
While there are no freestanding foreign bases
permanently located in the United States ,
there are now around 800 US
bases in foreign countries. Seventy years after World War II and 62 years after
the Korean War, there are still 174 US “base sites” in Germany , 113 in Japan ,
and 83 in South Korea ,
according to the Pentagon. Hundreds more dot the planet in around 80 countries,
including Aruba and Australia ,
Bahrain and Bulgaria , Colombia ,
Kenya , and Qatar , among
many other places. Although few Americans realize it, the United States
likely has more bases in foreign lands than any other people, nation, or empire
in history.
Oddly enough, however, the mainstream media rarely
report or comment on the issue. For years, during debates over the closure of
the prison at the base in Guantánamo Bay , Cuba , nary a pundit or politician wondered why
the United States
has a base on Cuban territory in the first place or questioned whether we
should have one there at all. Rarely does anyone ask if we need hundreds of
bases overseas or if, at an estimated annual cost of perhaps $156 billion or
more, the United States
can afford them. Rarely does anyone wonder how we would feel if China, Russia,
or Iran built even a single base anywhere near our borders, let alone in the
United States.
“Without grasping the dimensions of this
globe-girdling Baseworld,” Chalmers Johnson insisted, “one can’t begin to
understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the degree to
which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional order.” Alarmed
and inspired by his work and aware that relatively few have heeded his
warnings, I’ve spent years trying to track and understand what he called our
“empire of bases.” While logic might seem to suggest that these bases make us
safer, I’ve come to the opposite conclusion: in a range of ways our overseas
bases have made us all less secure, harming everyone from US military personnel
and their families to locals living near the bases to those of us whose taxes
pay for the way our government garrisons the globe.
We are now, as we’ve been for the last seven decades,
a Base Nation that extends around the world, and it’s long past time that we
faced that fact.
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THE BASE NATION’S SCALE
Our 800 bases outside the 50 states and Washington , D.C. ,
come in all sizes and shapes. Some are city-sized “Little Americas”—places like
Ramstein Air Base in Germany,Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and the little known
Navy and Air Force base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. These support a
remarkable infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, power plants, housing
complexes, and an array of amenities often referred to as “Burger Kings and
bowling alleys.” Among the smallest US installations globally are “lily
pad” bases (also known as “cooperative security locations”), which tend to
house drones, surveillance aircraft, or pre-positioned weaponry and supplies. These
are increasingly found in parts of Africa and Eastern Europe that had
previously lacked much of a US
military presence.
Other facilities scattered across the planet include
ports and airfields, repair complexes, training areas, nuclear weapons
installations, missile testing sites, arsenals, warehouses, barracks, military
schools, listening and communications posts, and a growing array of drone
bases. Military hospitals and prisons, rehab facilities, CIA paramilitary
bases, and intelligence facilities (including former CIA “black site” prisons)
must also be considered part of our Base Nation because of their military
functions. Even US military
resorts and recreation areas in places like the Bavarian Alps and Seoul , South
Korea , are bases of a kind. Worldwide, the
military runs more than 170 golf courses.
The Pentagon’s overseas presence is actually even
larger. There are US
troops or other military personnel in about 160 foreign countries and
territories, including small numbers of marines guarding embassies and larger
deployments of trainers and advisors like the roughly 3,500 now working with
the Iraqi Army. And don’t forget the Navy’s 11 aircraft carriers. Each should
be considered a kind of floating base, or as the Navy tellingly refers to them,
“four and a half acres of sovereign US territory.” Finally, above the
seas, one finds a growing military presence in space.
The United
States isn’t, however, the only country to
control military bases outside its territory. Great
Britain still has about seven bases and France five in
former colonies. Russia
has around eight in former Soviet republics. For the first time since World War
II, Japan’s “Self-Defense Forces” have a foreign base in Djibouti in the Horn
of Africa, alongside US and French bases there.South Korea, India, Chile,
Turkey, and Israel each reportedly have at least one foreign base. There are
also reports that China
may be seeking its first base overseas. In total, these countries probably have
about 30 installations abroad, meaning that the United States has approximately 95%
of the world’s foreign bases.
“FORWARD” FOREVER?
Although the United States has had bases in
foreign lands since shortly after it gained its independence, nothing like
today’s massive global deployment of military force was imaginable until World
War II. In 1940, with the flash of a pen, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
signed a “destroyers-for-bases” deal with Great Britain that instantly gave
the United States 99-year leases to installations in British colonies
worldwide. Base acquisition and construction accelerated rapidly once the
country entered the war. By 1945, the US military was building base
facilities at a rate of 112 a month. By war’s end, the global total topped
2,000 sites. In only five years, the United
States had developed history’s first truly global network
of bases, vastly overshadowing that of the British Empire
upon which “the sun never set.”
After the war, the military returned about half the
installations but maintained what historian George Stambuk termed a “permanent
institution” of bases abroad. Their number spiked during the wars in Korea and Vietnam , declining after each of
them. By the time the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, there were about 1,600 US bases abroad, with some 300,000 US troops stationed on those in Europe alone.
Although the military vacated about 60% of its foreign
garrisons in the 1990s, the overall base infrastructure stayed relatively
intact. Despite additional base closures in Europe and to a lesser extent in East Asia over the last decade and despite the absence of
a superpower adversary, nearly 250,000 troops are still deployed on
installations worldwide. Although there are about half as many bases as there
were in 1989, the number of countries with US bases has roughly doubled from 40
to 80. In recent years, President Obama’s “Pacific pivot” has meant billions of
dollars in profligate spending in Asia , where
the military already had hundreds of bases and tens of thousands of troops. Billions
more have been sunk into building an unparalleled permanent base infrastructure
inevery Persian Gulf country save Iran . In Europe ,
the Pentagon has been spending billions more erecting expensive new bases at
the same time that it has been closing others.
Since the start of the Cold War, the idea that our
country should have a large collection of bases and hundreds of thousands of
troops permanently stationed overseas has remained a quasi-religious dictum of
foreign and national security policy. The nearly 70-year-old idea underlying
this deeply held belief is known as the “forward strategy.” Originally, the
strategy held that the United States
should maintain large concentrations of military forces and bases as close as
possible to the Soviet Union to hem in and
“contain” its supposed urge to expand.
But the disappearance of another superpower to contain
made remarkably little difference to the forward strategy. Chalmers Johnson
first grew concerned about our empire of bases when he recognized that the
structure of the “American Raj” remained largely unchanged despite the collapse
of the supposed enemy.
Two decades after the Soviet
Union ’s demise, people across the political spectrum still
unquestioningly assume that overseas bases and forward-deployed forces are
essential to protect the country. George W. Bush’s administration was typical
in insisting that bases abroad “maintained the peace” and were “symbols of… US
commitments to allies and friends.” The Obama administration has similarly
declared that protecting the American people and international security
“requires a global security posture.”
Support for the forward strategy has remained the
consensus among politicians of both parties, national security experts,
military officials, journalists, and almost everyone else in Washington ’s power structure. Opposition of
any sort to maintaining large numbers of overseas bases and troops has long
been pilloried as peacenik idealism or the sort of isolationism that allowed
Hitler to conquer Europe .
THE COSTS OF GARRISONING THE WORLD
As Johnson showed us, there are many reasons to
question the overseas base status quo. The most obvious one is economic.
Garrisons overseas are very expensive. According to the RAND Corporation, even
when host countries like Japan
and Germany cover some of
the costs, US taxpayers still pay an annual average of $10,000 to $40,000 more
per year to station a member of the military abroad than in the United States . The
expense of transportation, the higher cost of living in some host countries,
and the need to provide schools, hospitals, housing, and other support to
family members of military personnel mean that the dollars add up
quickly—especially with more than half a million troops, family members, and
civilian employees on bases overseas at any time.
By my very conservative calculations, maintaining
installations and troops overseas cost at least $85 billion in 2014—more than
the discretionary budget of every government agency except the Defense
Department itself. If the US
presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is
included, that bill reaches $156 billion or more.
While bases may be costly for taxpayers, they are
extremely profitable for the country’s privateers of twenty-first-century war
like DynCorp International and former Halliburton subsidiary KBR. As Chalmers
Johnson noted, “Our installations abroad bring profits to civilian industries,”
which win billions in contracts annually to “build and maintain our far-flung
outposts.”
Meanwhile, many of the communities hosting bases
overseas never see the economic windfalls that US and local leaders regularly
promise. Some areas, especially in poor rural communities, have seen short-term
economic booms touched off by base construction. In the long-term, however,
most bases rarely create sustainable, healthy local economies. Compared with
other forms of economic activity, they represent unproductive uses of land,
employ relatively few people for the expanses occupied, and contribute little
to local economic growth. Research has consistently shown that when bases
finally close, theeconomic impact is generally limited and in some cases
actually positive—that is, local communities can end up better off when they
trade bases for housing, schools, shopping complexes, and other forms of
economic development.
Meanwhile for the United States, investing taxpayer
dollars in the construction and maintenance of overseas bases means forgoing
investments in areas like education, transportation, housing, and healthcare,
despite the fact that these industries are more of a boon to overall economic
productivity and create more jobs compared to equivalent military spending. Think
about what $85 billion per year would mean in terms of rebuilding the country’s
crumbling civilian infrastructure.
THE HUMAN TOLL
Beyond the financial costs are the human ones. The
families of military personnel are among those who suffer from the spread of
overseas bases given the strain of distant deployments, family separations, and
frequent moves. Overseas bases also contribute to the shocking rates of sexual
assault in the military: an estimated 30% of servicewomen are victimized during
their time in the military and a disproportionate number of these crimes happen
at bases abroad. Outside the base gates, in places like South Korea ,
one often finds exploitative prostitution industries geared to US military
personnel.
Worldwide, bases have caused widespread environmental
damage because of toxic leaks, accidents, and in some cases the deliberate
dumping of hazardous materials. GI crime has long angered locals. In Okinawa and elsewhere, US troops have repeatedly
committed horrific acts of rape against local women. From Greenland to the
tropical island
of Diego Garcia , the
military has displaced local peoples from their lands to build its bases.
In contrast to frequently invoked rhetoric about
spreading democracy, the military has shown a preference for establishing bases
in undemocratic and often despotic states like Qatar
and Bahrain .
In Iraq , Afghanistan , and Saudi
Arabia , US
bases have created fertile breeding grounds for radicalism and
anti-Americanism. The presence of bases near Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia
was a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s
professed motivation for the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Although this kind of perpetual turmoil is little
noticed at home, bases abroad have all too often generate grievances, protest,
and antagonistic relationships. Although few here recognize it, our bases are a
major part of the image the United
States presents to the world—and they often
show us in an extremely unflattering light.
CREATING A NEW COLD WAR, BASE BY BASE
It is also not at all clear that bases enhance
national security and global peace in any way. In the absence of a superpower
enemy, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from US shores are
necessary to defend the United States—or even its allies—is a hard argument to
make. On the contrary, the global collection of bases has generally enabled the
launching of military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice that
have resulted in repeated disasters, costing millions of lives and untold destruction
from Vietnam to Iraq.
By making it easier to wage foreign wars, bases
overseas have ensured that military action is an ever more attractive
option—often the only imaginable option—for US policymakers. As the
anthropologist Catherine Lutz has said, when all you have in your foreign
policy toolbox is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. Ultimately,
bases abroad have frequently made war more likely rather than less.
Proponents of the long-outdated forward strategy will
reply that overseas bases “deter” enemies and help keep the global peace. As
supporters of the status quo, they have been proclaiming such security benefits
as self-evident truths for decades. Few have provided anything of substance to
support their claims. While there is some evidence that military forces can
indeed deter imminent threats, little if any research suggests that overseas
bases are an effective form of long-term deterrence. Studies by both the Bush
administration and theRAND Corporation&—not exactly left-wing
peaceniks—indicate that advances in transportation technology have largely
erased the advantage of stationing troops abroad. In the case of a legitimate
defensive war or peacekeeping operation, the military could generally deploy
troops just as quickly from domestic bases as from most bases abroad. Rapid
sealift and airlift capabilities coupled with agreements allowing the use of
bases in allied nations and, potentially, pre-positioned supplies are a
dramatically less expensive and less inflammatory alternative to maintaining
permanent bases overseas.
It is also questionable whether such bases actually
increase the security of host nations. The presence of US bases can turn a
country into an explicit target for foreign powers or militants—just as US installations
have endangered Americans overseas.
Similarly, rather than stabilizing dangerous regions,
foreign bases frequently heighten military tensions and discourage diplomatic
solutions to conflicts. Placing US
bases near the borders of countries like China ,
Russia , and Iran , for
example, increases threats to their security and encourages them to respond by
boosting their own military spending and activity. Imagine how US leaders would
respond if China were to
build even a single small base in Mexico ,
Canada , or the Caribbean . Notably, the most dangerous moment during the
Cold War—the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—revolved around the construction of
Soviet nuclear missile facilities in Cuba ,
roughly 90 miles from the US
border.
The creation and maintenance of so many US bases
overseas likewise encourages other nations to build their own foreign bases in
what could rapidly become an escalating “base race.” Bases near the borders of China and Russia , in particular, threaten to
fuel new cold wars. US
officials may insist that building yet more bases in East
Asia is a defensive act meant to ensure peace in the Pacific, but
tell that to the Chinese. That country’s leaders are undoubtedly not
“reassured” by the creation of yet more bases encircling their borders. Contrary
to the claim that such installations increase global security, they tend to
ratchet up regional tensions, increasing the risk of future military
confrontation.
In this way, just as the war on terror has become a
global conflict that only seems to spread terror, the creation of new US bases
to protect against imagined future Chinese or Russian threats runs the risk of
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. These bases may ultimately help create the
very threat they are supposedly designed to protect against. In other words,
far from making the world a safer place, US bases can actually make war more
likely and the country less secure.
BEHIND THE WIRE
In his farewell address to the nation upon leaving the
White House in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned the nation
about the insidious economic, political, and even spiritual effects of what he
dubbed “the military-industrial-congressional complex,” the vast interlocking
national security state born out of World War II. As Chalmers Johnson’s work
reminded us in this new century, our 70-year-old collection of bases is
evidence of how, despite Ike’s warning, the United States has entered a
permanent state of war with an economy, a government, and a global system of
power enmeshed in preparations for future conflicts.
We may think such bases have made us safer. In reality,
they’ve helped lock us inside a permanently militarized society that has made
all of us—everyone on this planet—less secure, damaging lives at home and
abroad.
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